And it took him a half hour to do that.
And afterward but only after he had pointed to Stener as the true henchman and stalking horse, who had, in turn, been used by political forces above him to accomplish certain financial results, which they were not willing to have ascribed to themselves, he continued with:
"But now, in the light of all this, only see how ridiculous all this is! How silly!
Frank A. Cowperwood had always been the agent of the city in these matters for years and years.
He worked under certain rules which he and Mr. Stener had agreed upon in the first place, and which obviously came from others, who were above Mr. Stener, since they were hold-over customs and rules from administrations, which had been long before Mr. Stener ever appeared on the scene as city treasurer.
One of them was that he could carry all transactions over until the first of the month following before he struck a balance.
That is, he need not pay any money over for anything to the city treasurer, need not send him any checks or deposit any money or certificates in the sinking-fund until the first of the month because—now listen to this carefully, gentlemen; it is important—because his transactions in connection with city loan and everything else that he dealt in for the city treasurer were so numerous, so swift, so uncalculated beforehand, that he had to have a loose, easy system of this kind in order to do his work properly—to do business at all.
Otherwise he could not very well have worked to the best advantage for Mr. Stener, or for any one else.
It would have meant too much bookkeeping for him—too much for the city treasurer.
Mr. Stener has testified to that in the early part of his story.
Albert Stires has indicated that that was his understanding of it.
Well, then what? Why, just this.
Would any jury suppose, would any sane business man believe that if such were the case Mr. Cowperwood would be running personally with all these items of deposit, to the different banks or the sinking-fund or the city treasurer's office, or would be saying to his head bookkeeper,
'Here, Stapley, here is a check for sixty thousand dollars. See that the certificates of loan which this represents are put in the sinking-fund to-day'? And why not?
What a ridiculous supposition any other supposition is!
As a matter of course and as had always been the case, Mr. Cowperwood had a system.
When the time came, this check and these certificates would be automatically taken care of.
He handed his bookkeeper the check and forgot all about it.
Would you imagine a banker with a vast business of this kind doing anything else?"
Mr. Steger paused for breath and inquiry, and then, having satisfied himself that his point had been sufficiently made, he continued:
"Of course the answer is that he knew he was going to fail.
Well, Mr. Cowperwood's reply is that he didn't know anything of the sort.
He has personally testified here that it was only at the last moment before it actually happened that he either thought or knew of such an occurrence.
Why, then, this alleged refusal to let him have the check to which he was legally entitled?
I think I know.
I think I can give a reason if you will hear me out."
Steger shifted his position and came at the jury from another intellectual angle:
"It was simply because Mr. George W. Stener at that time, owing to a recent notable fire and a panic, imagined for some reason—perhaps because Mr. Cowperwood cautioned him not to become frightened over local developments generally—that Mr. Cowperwood was going to close his doors; and having considerable money on deposit with him at a low rate of interest, Mr. Stener decided that Mr. Cowperwood must not have any more money—not even the money that was actually due him for services rendered, and that had nothing whatsoever to do with the money loaned him by Mr. Stener at two and one-half per cent.
Now isn't that a ridiculous situation?
But it was because Mr. George W. Stener was filled with his own fears, based on a fire and a panic which had absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Cowperwood's solvency in the beginning that he decided not to let Frank A. Cowperwood have the money that was actually due him, because he, Stener, was criminally using the city's money to further his own private interests (through Mr. Cowperwood as a broker), and in danger of being exposed and possibly punished.
Now where, I ask you, does the good sense of that decision come in?
Is it apparent to you, gentlemen?
Was Mr. Cowperwood still an agent for the city at the time he bought the loan certificates as here testified? He certainly was.
If so, was he entitled to that money?
Who is going to stand up here and deny it?
Where is the question then, as to his right or his honesty in this matter?
How does it come in here at all?
I can tell you.
It sprang solely from one source and from nowhere else, and that is the desire of the politicians of this city to find a scapegoat for the Republican party.
"Now you may think I am going rather far afield for an explanation of this very peculiar decision to prosecute Mr. Cowperwood, an agent of the city, for demanding and receiving what actually belonged to him. But I'm not.
Consider the position of the Republican party at that time.
Consider the fact that an exposure of the truth in regard to the details of a large defalcation in the city treasury would have a very unsatisfactory effect on the election about to be held.
The Republican party had a new city treasurer to elect, a new district attorney.
It had been in the habit of allowing its city treasurers the privilege of investing the funds in their possession at a low rate of interest for the benefit of themselves and their friends.
Their salaries were small. They had to have some way of eking out a reasonable existence.
Was Mr. George Stener responsible for this custom of loaning out the city money? Not at all.
Was Mr. Cowperwood? Not at all.
The custom had been in vogue long before either Mr. Cowperwood or Mr. Stener came on the scene.
Why, then, this great hue and cry about it now?
The entire uproar sprang solely from the fear of Mr. Stener at this juncture, the fear of the politicians at this juncture, of public exposure.